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Abstract 
Dialogue between different jurisdictional levels within complex constitutional systems is 
constantly on-going. Within the EU, this dialogue is an indispensable condition for the 
functioning of the Rule of Law, described as the tension between gubernaculum (the body of 
positive law) and jurisdictio (the principles of law beyond the sovereign’s reach). Unlike 
other constitutional systems where the dialogue between the legislature and the judiciary 
plays the crucial role, the interaction between national courts and the Court of Justice of the 
EU is the only way through which the EU can be precluded from becoming a self-defining, 
tyrannical, constitutional order. As national courts seek to protect their constitutional values, 
they supply an important source of jurisdictio. Although the EU system offers a wider 
understanding of dialogical frameworks, it is under threat of dissolution. Where the Court of 
Justice feigns to cherish this inter-judicial dialogue, in reality it relies on its own supremacy to 
construct the EU. 
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  1 
Introduction 
Any rule of law-based system, we argue, implies the control of the applicable law through dialogical 
legal considerations, elevating such dialogue – should it play an effective systemic law-limiting 
function – to a necessary element of the rule of law. The most popular example is of course the 
dialogue between the courts and the legislator, which has been deemed indispensable for the survival 
and flourishing of democracy.
1
 We make two claims taking it from there, before addressing the state 
of such dialogue in the EU. Firstly, it is not only democracy, but also the rule of law, which is 
guaranteed by the limitations of power through such means. Regarded in this vein the rule of law is 
not pure legality, but an effective tension between the two types of law not allowing the sovereign, 
while acting in line with competence limitations to overstep the boundary of the key principles of law, 
thereby undermining the rule of law.
2
 Secondly, we submit that the parties entering a meaningful 
dialogue with rule of law implications can vary depending on the core institutional features of the legal 
system in question. Not all legal systems allow for a dialogical control of values and norms, thus 
preserving the rule of law, through an engagement between the courts and the legislator. We use the 
European Union (EU) as an example of such a system, demonstrating that in order for the dialogical 
rule of law in the EU to flourish it is indispensable to establish the dialogue between the judiciaries at 
the different levels of the law. We then proceed to test how such dialogue evolved in the EU legal 
context, concluding that EU Rule of Law is undermined in the face of the breakdown of a meaningful 
conversation between the courts at the different levels of the law. 
Locating the dialogue: structure of the argument 
Within the world of jurisprudence, the classical representation on inter-institutional conversation has 
mostly been that of the dialogue between the legislature and the judiciary.
3
 It is the game of ‘Mother-
may-I’ where legislative action is tested through judicial review against a higher norm. Like the 
children’s game, the legislature will enact a measure, to which the judiciary will either respond 
negatively, or hand down further instructions on how to accomplish the wishes of the legislator within 
‘the rules’. Although judicial review is now an accepted part of numerous legal systems, the depth of 
the scrutiny and the openness of the system varies widely to concur with cultural and legal traditions. 
Scholars argue that the truest sense of ‘dialogue’ is observed in the Canadian legal tradition, especially 
regarding the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
4
 As Hogg and Bushel explain, clauses in the 
Charter of Rights make it possible for the legislative branch to react more easily to a struck down act.
5
 
The result is a more equitable relationship between the two branches of government, preserving a 
balance between (majoritarian) democracy and the safeguarding of higher norms.
6
 
Emphasis within the dialogue between the institutions of government has been on the age-old debate 
on the role of the judiciary and the threat it poses to the rule of democracy.
7
 There is a natural conflict 
                                                     
1
  M Kumm, ‘The Idea of Socratic Contestation and the Right to Justification’ (2010) 4 L. & Ethics Hum. Rts. 
142. 
2
  G Palombella, ‘Beyond Legality – Before Democracy’ in C Closa and D Kochenov (eds), Reinforcing Rule of 
Law Oversight in the European Union (CUP 2016) (and the works cited therein). 
3
  J Waldron, ‘Some Models of Dialogue between Judges and Legislators’ (2004) 23 Supreme Court LRev. 7. 
4
  PW Hogg and AA Bushell, ‘The Charter Dialogue between Courts and Legislatures.’ (1997) 35 Osgoode Hall 
LJ 75. 
5
  Notably, section 33 of the Charter, which allows for a relatively easy intercession in the original act, 
disapplying specific provisions which have been deemed non-compliant by the courts. 
6
  For a critique, see LB Tremblay, ‘The Legitimacy of Judicial Review’ (2005) 3 I-CON 617. 
7
  J Waldron, ‘The Core of the Case against Judicial Review’ (2005) 115 Yale LJ 1346. 
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that exists in all legal systems where societal power is vested in parliaments through popular vote, yet 
the product of this power can, no matter the representative force behind it, be undone through the 
supremacy vested in (apex)courts. This has been especially the case in ‘revolutionary’ states, where 
the perceived arbitrariness of a judge mirrors that of the renounced monarch.
8
 In the extreme cases all 
the law is replaced either by the ‘revolutionary consciousness’ of the judge or by the free rein of the 
‘will of the people’ and a complete elimination of judicial review. Yet although born from thoughts of 
democracy, we contend that such dialogues in fact find their locus in the control of law by law on 
different levels. This entails that this dialogue is not limited to the classical court/legislator scenario. 
A number of advanced democratic legal systems provide useful counterpoint to the Canadian-style 
dialogue, where immunity to the legislature/courts dialogue is observable for reasons which are more 
of a structural, systemic nature, rather than those related purely to legal and democratic culture. The 
EU is one of such systems.
9
 In fact, leaving aside the obvious tensions surrounding its auto-
characterization as a democracy,
10
 the fundamental differences in institutional design between, say 
Canada and the EU would be the most relevant explanation. One should look, in particular, at the 
prominent role that the ECJ plays in the shaping of ‘negative’ as opposed to ‘positive’ integration, 
which is based on red-lines and limitations on the direction and extent of the national legislative 
activity in the areas where the supranational EU legislator is not necessarily empowered to act. This 
policing of substance through the procedures designed to limit the competences of particular levels of 
the law to act in a world where the supranational legislator actually cannot be competent to decide, 
while the ECJ is perceived to be, precisely, doing its job, is what makes the classical approach to 
constitutional dialogue adopted in the literature not infrequently unusable at the supranational level.  
We thus fully side with Marc Dawson, who has shown, with only minimal reservations, that ‘the 
present-day EU carries few of the background conditions necessary for a sustainable dialogue between 
the Court and the legislatures to take hold’.11 As a result, the ‘Canada-style’ constitutional dialogue in 
its traditional understanding, when verbatim applied to the EU, could be quite beyond the point. This 
does not mean, however, that the EU does not know dialogical constitutionalism, quite to the contrary. 
The crucial distinguishing feature of the dialogue as practised in the EU, is that it happens largely 
between the judiciaries of the different levels of the law. This is only logical: through their ability to 
police the sphere of competences claimed by the ECJ, the national courts are a more effective 
opponent of the supranational Court in checking EU law than any legislature would be. In fact, since 
supremacy forecloses dialogue with national legislatures while the European legislator is not 
competent to enter any dialogue when negative integration is at stake, no dialogue between the 
legislature and the courts is possible at all in a very large area of possible constitutional conflicts. The 
same does not hold true for the dialogue between the courts at different levels, potentially bringing 
                                                     
8
  This can be easily demonstrated by the developments regarding judicial review in countries such as France (on 
to this day), Weimar Germany or the resistance that exists against judicial review in the US. Some examples 
can be found here: G Jasper, Der Schutz der Republik; Studien zur staatlichen Sicherung der Demokratie in 
der Weimarer Republik, 1922-1930. (JCB Mohr 1963); M Stolleis, ‘Judicial Review, Administrative 
Review, and Constitutional Review in the Weimar Republic’ (2003) 16 Ratio Juris 266; JE Beardsley, ‘The 
Constitutional Council and Constitutional Liberties in France’ (1972) 20 AJCL 431; A Stone Sweet, 
‘Politics of Constitutional Review in France and Europe’ (2007) 5 ICON 69; J Waldron, ‘Judicial Review 
and Judicial Supremacy’ (NYU School of Law 2014) Public Law Research Paper No. 14-57. 
9
  See also the tradition in the Netherlands, G Van der Schyff, ‘Constitutional Review by the Judiciary in the 
Netherlands’ (2010) 11 German LJ 275. 
10
  A von Bogdandy, ‘The Prospect of a European Republic’ (2005) 42 CMLRev 913; K. Lenaerts and JA 
Gutiérrez-Fons, ‘Epilogue on EU Citizenship: Hopes and Fears’, in D Kochenov (ed), EU Citizenship and 
Federalism: The Role of Rights (CUP, 2017); but see G Davies, ‘Social Legitimacy and Purposive Power: 
The End, the Means and the Consent of the People’, in D Kochenov, G de Búrca and A Williams (eds), 
Europe’s Justice Deficit? (Hart 2015). 
11
  M Dawson, ‘Constitutional Dialogue between Courts and Legislatures in the European Union’ (2013) 19 EPL 
369, 371. 
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about the same results as the Canadian dialogical practices praised in the literature. This seemingly lies 
behind the elevation of the Bundesverfassungsgericht (BverfG) to the level of a credible conversation 
partner of the ECJ, as well as Czech, Polish
12
 and other national constitutional courts and tribunals’ 
claim to fame. 
Needless to say, the altered locus of dialogue in the EU does not and cannot alter the key function of 
it: both the EU dialogue between the judiciaries and the classical instances of constitutional dialogue 
can ultimately be viewed as amounting to supplying examples of the dialogical Rule of Law, we 
argue, where a modern legal system is only viewed as based on the Rule of Law if its law is, once 
again, controlled by law. With the shift of the main point of law/law tension from the legislature/courts 
duo to the court/courts scenario, the essential rationale as well as the functional outcomes of the 
dialogue remains the same. Both are clearly instances of constitutional dialogue. Both scenarios aim to 
ensure the adherence of the Rule of Law in the constitutional system in question. 
This paper’s aims are thus twofold. First we present the dialogical Rule of Law, which we propose as 
the core idea behind both types of constitutional dialogue. Having outlined its importance and inspired 
by Gianluigi Palombella’s work on the subject, we move on to find the proofs of the existence of the 
dialogical Rule of Law in the EU, drawing on a number of examples of the possible tensions between 
the different types of the law. Having found none in practice, but not excluding the emergence of the 
dialogical Rule of Law in the EU in theory, we then move to the inter-courts dialogue sensu stricto, to 
give an overview of some recent developments in this area, which is absolutely vital in EU law in the 
absence of the conditions for the legislature/courts dialogue ‘Canada-style’. Our conclusion is 
discomforting – EU law is not based on the Rule of Law, at least not in the useful dialogical sense 
opposed to the circular reading of ‘law is made in accordance with the law thus there is rule of law’. 
The ‘Mother-may-I’ game is not over, however, and we are less pessimistic than what our discussion 
should probably call for. The EU is a constantly developing system and flagging the no Rule of Law 
malaise is not a death sentence but a helpful diagnosis, as we see it. This is not to befog the main 
finding: a breakdown in dialogue means the annihilation of the Rule of Law in the given system of 
law. 
Dialogical Rule of Law in the EU 
The Rule of Law is a classic example of an essentially contested concept:
13
 the broad academic 
doctrine is well known
14
 and the debate is constantly ongoing.
15
 The last available definition in the 
EU,
16
 inspired by the Venice Commission’s guidelines17 could provide a solid illustration of the 
                                                     
12
  That is at least before its destruction in the Law and Justice (PiS)-orchestrated attack on the national 
constitution: TT Koncewicz, ‘Of Institutions, Democracy, Constitutional Self-Defence and the Rule of Law’ 
(2016) 53 CMLRev 1753. 
13
  For a brilliant outline of the history of contestation, see, J Waldron, ‘Is the Rule of Law an Essentially 
Contested Concept (in Florida)?’ (2002) 21 Law and Philosophy 137. 
14
  For a multi-disciplinary overview, see e.g., G Hadfield and B Weingast, ‘Microfoundations of the Rule of 
Law’ (2014) 17 Annual Review of Political Science. 21; L Pech, ‘The Rule of Law as a Constitutional 
Principle of the European Union.’ (NYU School of Law 2009) No. 04/09 (and the literature cited therein).  
15
  For the recent key contributions, see, W Schröder, Strengthening the Rule of Law in Europe: From a Common 
Concept to Mechanisms of Implementation (Hart 2016); L Morlino and G Palombella (eds), Rule of Law and 
Democracy: Inquiries Into Internal and External Issues (Brill 2010); G Palombella and N Walker (eds), 
Relocating the Rule of Law (Hart 2009). 
16
  Commission, ‘A New EU Framework to Strengthen the Rule of Law’ COM (2014) 158. 
17
  Venice Commission Document CDL-AD(2016)007-e ‘Rule of Law Checklist’ (adopted in 106th Plenary 
Session, Venice, 11–12 March 2016), as well as in the earlier version thereof: Venice Commission 
Document CDL-AD(2011)003rev-e ‘Report on the Rule of Law’ (adopted in 86th Plenary Session, Venice, 
25–26 March 2011). 
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current state of the definitional debate as internalised by the EU institutions. Whether one agrees with 
the Venice Commission’s approach or not, it seems to be beyond any doubt what the Rule of Law is 
not. It is not democracy, the protection of human rights or similar wonderful things, each of them 
definitely boasting its own sound claim to existence as a notion independent from the Rule of Law.
18
 
And it is not mere legality, which is adherence to the law on the books, read the whims of the 
sovereign. 
One theoretical approach to the meaning of the Rule of Law in the panoply of definitions emerges as 
particularly attractive, however. Once the Rule of Law and legality are distinguished, the basic 
meaning of the Rule of Law comes down to the idea of the subordination of the law to another kind of 
law, which is not up to the sovereign to change at will.
19
 This idea, traceable back to mediaeval 
England,
20
 is usually described with recourse to two key notions, to reflect the fundamental duality of 
the law’s fabric, indispensable for the operation of the Rule of Law as a principle of law:21 jurisdictio 
– the law untouchable for the day-to-day rules running the legal system and removed from the ambit 
of purview of the sovereign – and gubernaculum, which is the use of the general rule-making power.22 
Even in this age of popular sovereignty this statement is obviously true, since democracy should not 
be capable of annihilating the law. Indeed, this is one of the key points made by the defenders of 
judicial review.
23
 Such rule of law is dialogical in essence. It presupposes and constantly relies upon a 
constant taming of law with law.
24
 On this count the Rule of Law implies that the law – gubernaculum 
– should always be controlled by law – jurisdictio – lying outwith the sovereign’s reach.25 In this 
context it is clear that the absolute domination of either gubernaculum or jurisdictio necessarily 
destroys the core of the Rule of Law, which is the tension between the two.  
Unlike despotic or totalitarian regimes, where the ruler is free to do anything he pleases; or 
problematic states, such as Hungary, where the constitution is a political tool; Poland, where the 
executive ignores the constitution,
26
 or pre-constitutional democracies, which equate the law with 
legislation,
27
 the majority of constitutional democracies in the world today recognise the distinction 
between jurisdictio and gubernaculum, thus achieving an approximation of the dialogical rule of law, 
in terms of maintaining and fostering the constant tension between these two facets of the law. 
Authority should itself be bound by clear legal norms which are outside of its control. Indeed, this is 
the key feature of post-war constitutionalism. The jurisdictio–gubernaculum distinction, lying at the 
                                                     
18
  One should not forget the wise words of Joseph Raz: ‘We have no need to be converted into the rule of law 
just in order to believe … that good should triumph’: J Raz, ‘The Rule of Law and Its Virtue’, The Authority 
of Law: Essays on Law and Morality (OUP 1979) 211. 
19
  Palombella, ‘Beyond Legality – Before Democracy’ (n 2). 
20
  JP Reid, Rule of Law: The Jurisprudence of Liberty in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries (Northern 
Illinois University Press 2004). 
21
  G Palombella, È Possibile una Legalità Globale? (Il Mulino 2012). 
22
  For a detailed exposé, see Palombella, ‘Beyond Legality – Before Democracy’ (n 2); See also, G Palombella, 
‘The Rule of Law and Its Core’ in G Palombella and N Walker (eds), Relocating the Rule of Law (Hart 
2009) 30. 
23
  Cf. Kumm (n 1). 
24
  According to Palombella ‘[it] amounts to preventing one dominant source of law and its unconstrained whim, 
from absorbing all the available normativity’, see, ‘The Principled, and Winding, Road to Al-Dulimi. 
Interpreting the Interpreters’ [2014] QIL 15, 18; D Georgiev, ‘Politics or Rule of Law’ (1993) 4 EJIL 1, 4. 
25
  For an analysis, see, Palombella, È possibile una legalità globale? (n 21); Palombella, ‘The Rule of Law and 
Its Core’ (n 22); See also, Palombella, ‘Beyond Legality – Before Democracy’ (n 2). 
26
  Koncewicz (n 12). 
27
  In a pre-constitutional state, the Rechtsstaat shapes a reality, in the words of Gianfranco Poggi, where ‘there is 
a relation of near-identity between the state and its law’: G Poggi, The Development of the Modern State 
(Stanford 1978) 238. 
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core of what the Rule of Law is about, can be policed either by courts, or even by the structure of the 
constitution itself through removing certain domains from gubernaculum’s scope.28 The ideology of 
human rights is of huge significance in this context.
29
 Furthermore, the existence of international law
30
 
and, of course, supranational legal orders,
31
 contributes to the policing of the said duality.
32
 The 
policing of the jurisdictio–gubernaculum divide is thus possible both through the means internal and 
external to the given legal system. 
From Lord Mackenzie Stuart
33
 to Les Verts, which characterises the Treaties as ‘a constitutional 
charter based on the Rule of Law’,34 what we have been hearing about the Rule of Law in the EU 
really amounts to compliance with own law.
35
 This is an established understanding of legality.
36
 
Legality is not enough to ensure that the EU behaves like – and is – a true rule of law-based 
constitutional system. Palombella is right: ‘the Rule of Law cannot mean just the self-referentiality of 
a legal order’,37 which is the reason why contemporary constitutionalism is usually understood as 
implying, among other things, additional restraints through law:
38
 restraints which are, crucially, not 
simply democratic or political.
39
 
                                                     
28
  Y Roznai, Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments (OUP 2017). 
29
  G Frankenberg, ‘Human Rights and the Belief in a Just World’ (2014) 12 I-CON 35. 
30
  R Dworkin, ‘A New Philosophy of International Law’ (2013) 41 Philosophy and Public Affairs 2. 
31
  For an argument that numerous Central and Eastern European States were actually motivated by the desire for 
external legal checks on their laws – a jurisdictio – when joining the CoE, see, W Sadurski, 
Constitutionalism and the Enlargement of Europe (OUP 2012). 
32
  Palombella, È possibile una legalità globale? (n 21) ch 2. 
33
  Lord Mackenzie-Stuart, The European Communities and the Rule of Law (Stevens and Sons1977). 
34
  Case 294/83 Partie Ecologiste ‘Les Verts’ v. Parliament EU:C:1986:166 [1986] ECR 1339, 23. See also 
Opinion 1/91 EEA Agreement EU:C:1991:490 [1991] ECR 6097. 
35
  M Fernández Esteban, The Rule of Law in the European Constitution (Kluwer Law International 1999); also, 
U Everling, ‘The European Union as a Federal Association of States and Citizens’ in A von Bogdandy and J 
Bast (eds), Principles of European Constitutional Law (2nd edn, Beck/Hart 2011) 701; M Zuleeg, ‘The 
Advantages of the European Constitution’ in A Bogdandy and J Bast (eds), Principles of European 
Constitutional Law (2nd edn, Beck/Hart 2011) 772–779; EU Institutions’ own accounts of what is means by 
the Rule of Law beyond the tautology of ‘being bound by law’ present a most diverse account, which found 
an expression in EU’s external action: L Pech, ‘Promoting the Rule of Law Abroad’ in F Amtenbrink and D 
Kochenov (eds), The European Union’s Shaping of the International Legal Order (2013) 108. 
36
  E.g. the contributions in LFM Besselink, F Pennings and S Prechal (ads.), The Eclipse of the Legality 
Principle in the European Union (Kluwer Law International 2011). 
37
  Palombella, ‘Beyond Legality – Before Democracy’ (n 2); Compare with Krygier: ‘To try to capture this 
elusive phenomenon by focusing on characteristics of laws and legal institutions is, I believe, to start in the 
wrong place and move in the wrong direction’, M Krygier, ‘The Rule of Law. An Abuser’s Guide’ in A Sajó 
(ed), Abuse: the dark side of fundamental rights (Eleven 2006) 129; See also, BZ Tamanaha, Law as a 
Means to an End (CUP 2006). 
38
  For a clear discussion of the relationship between constitutionalism and the Rule of Law, see, M Krygier, 
‘Tempering Power: Realist-Idealism, Constitutionalism, and the Rule of Law’ in M Adams, A Meuwese and 
EMH Hirsch Ballin (eds), Constitutionalism and the Rule of Law (CUP 2017). 
39
  The virtually complete depoliticisation of the law has been one of the key criticisms of the EU legal order: J 
Přibáň, ‘The Evolving Idea of Political Justice in the EU’ in D Kochenov, G de Búrca and A Williams (eds), 
Europe’s Justice Deficit? (Hart 2015) 193; and in the same volume, MA Wilkinson, ‘Politicising Europe’s 
Justice Deficit: Some Preliminaries’ at 111. 
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EU law’s scrutiny from above: international law 
At the international level, the EU seems to be the only legal system in Europe which fiercely objects to 
any outside scrutiny,
40
 pushing the glorification of own autopoetic nature almost to the extreme. 
Outside scrutiny ‘from below’, has remained only a (albeit productive) threat41 and the ECJ has 
expressly prohibited – now twice42 – outside scrutiny from above, all in the name of ‘autonomy’. In 
essence, in the EU’s particular case, autonomy means that the EU tends to tolerate no constraints on its 
ability to rule. The defence of its gubernaculum – its acquis – from the internal or external 
contestation is clearly elevated to one of its chief priorities. Just listen to the Grand Chamber : ‘[W]hen 
implementing EU law, the Member States may, under EU law, be required to presume that 
fundamental rights have been observed by the other Member States, so that […] they may not check 
whether that other Member State has actually, [...], observed the fundamental rights guaranteed by the 
EU’.43 Where the Rule of Law is not enforced in the Member States of the EU via the supranational 
legal order the Member States themselves are not free to consider each-others’ deficiencies in the 
arena of values, particularly the Rule of Law. Officially, this is about ruling within the EU’s own 
sphere of competences, yet the Court’s reliance on the argument of ‘autonomy’ makes it clear that 
what we are dealing with is a recurrent claim to power, unchecked externally.
44
 This is precisely the 
reason to be suspicious and to want more rather than less Socratic contestation. 
Even where the Union clearly is a member of a Human Rights regime, the Court continues to interpret 
the binding principles in such a way as to allow for their effects to be limited. This is to a large extent 
possible by the manner in which the Court has shaped the way in which international law finds its way 
into the European legal order. International agreements become an immediate part of the Union’s legal 
order.
45
 The effect thereof is that the interpretation of these agreements falls under the jurisdiction of 
the ECJ.
46
 Although it then becomes an issue on whether the competences within the field of operation 
of the agreement fall within the exclusive or the shared competences of the Union,
47
 the result will 
mostly be the same,
48
 the Court will act as the interpreter and adjudicator of any treaty regime the 
Union becomes a member of.
49
 This has the remarkable effect that, given the reliance of the Court on 
                                                     
40
  One could no doubt pose a question, whether the CoE system is a legitimate candidate to become the second. 
I thank Michael Ioannidis for this point. 
41
  BVerfGE 37, 271 (Solange I). For an analysis of the whole story see, FC Mayer, ‘Multilevel Constitutional 
Jurisdiction’ in A Bogdandy and J Bast (eds), Principles of European Constitutional Law (2nd edn, 
Beck/Hart 2011) 410–420; JHH Weiler and NJS Lockhart, ‘“Taking Rights Seriously” Seriously’ (1995) 32 
CMLRev (parts I and II). 
42
  Opinion 2/94 (ECHR Accession I) EU:C:1996:140 [1996] ECR I-1759; Opinion 2/13 (ECHR Accession II) 
EU:C:2014:2454. 
43
  Opinion 2/13 (ECHR Accession II) EU:C:2014:2454, para. 192 (emphasis added). Cf. P Eeckhout, ‘Opinion 
2/13 on EU Accession to the ECHR and Judicial Dialogue: Autonomy or Autarky’ (2015) 38 Fordham Int’l 
LJ 955; D Kochenov, ‘EU Law without the Rule of Law’ (2015) 34 YEL 74. 
44
  Eeckhout made a most persuasive argument that federal division of competences cannot possibly play any 
role here, since, no matter which level of government is responsible, the fundamental values, as expressed in 
the ECHR have to be respected, as rightly put by Eeckhout ‘for the CJEU […] to assume that responsibility 
and division of competences are one and the same, is not an example of proper judicial reasoning, to say the 
least’. It is thus clear that the ECJ simply deploys ‘autonomy’ as a flimsy pretext to ensure that its own 
jurisdiction is unchecked: Eeckhout (n 43). 
45
  Case C-344/04 IATA and ELFAA EU:C:2006:10 [2006] ECR I-403 para. 36. 
46
  By way of Article 19(1) TEU. 
47
  P Eeckhout, EU External Relations Law (2nd edn, OUP 2011) ch 7. 
48
  S Gáspár-Szilágyi, ‘EU Member State Enforcement of “Mixed” Agreements and Access to Justice’ (2013) 40 
LIEI 163. 
49
  Even where there is an enforcement mechanism in place, N Lavranos, ‘Concurrence of Jurisdiction between 
the ECJ and Other International Courts and Tribunals’ (2005) 14 ELRev. 213. 
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the autonomy and inviolability of the Union’s primary law, the Court will enforce, indeed sometimes 
going as far as to have a far reaching effect on the autonomy of the Member State’s legal systems,50 
norms and rules with which it itself does not comply. Indeed, when confronted by the fact that this 
scenario seems to be in violation with the Rule of Law, the Union’s argumentation turns circular. The 
Union cannot be in violation of the Rule of Law, as it has laid down in the Treaty that it adheres to the 
Rule of Law.
51
 Furthermore, as the international agreement has become an integral part of the Union’s 
legal order, any outside scrutiny of this statement through compliance mechanisms or tribunals will 
not produce an effect. As the Court has made it eminently clear in its Opinions on accession to the 
Convention of Human Rights, such scrutiny would in effect make it possible for an outside force to 
interpret EU law. This of course, will not stand. Therefore, pronouncements like the recent decision by 
the Aarhus Convention Compliance Committee,
52
 will produce no effect whatsoever in the EU legal 
order.
53
  
The EU, acting chiefly through its Court, seems to be immune to irony: it does consider itself better 
than the Member States’ constitutional systems,54 which apparently need the subjection to 
international scrutiny through numerous treaty bodies as well as, probably most importantly, the 
European Court of Human Rights on top of their machinery of internal legal constraints to police their 
respective jurisdictio–gubernaculum divide, constraints which the EU seemingly does not have.55 
Although the EU has its internal procedures to ensure that legality be observed, what is missing is 
precisely what Palombella characterises as ‘a limitation of law(-production), through law’.56 
EU’s scrutiny from below: national constitutional orders 
The core autopoetic argument for immunity from outside scrutiny from above is that the EU adheres to 
a rich catalogue of values and thus ‘knows better’. This argument is flawed, however, since it is based 
on an assumption of compliance, which the EU cannot possibly police, as it is largely outside of its 
sphere of competences. The constitutional values and traditions have always been a part of the values 
                                                     
50
  The clearest example is the approach of the Court to the environmental rights regime of the Aarhus 
Convention. Although the Court’s own case law regarding standing rights for public interest litigants is 
extremely restrictive, it has forced Member States to comply with the standard set out in the Convention, as 
it is now an integral part of EU law. See, amongst many, J Reichel, ‘Judicial Control in a Globalised Legal 
Order – A One Way Track?’ (2010) 3 REALaw 69; and H Roer-Eide and M Eliantonio, ‘Meaning of 
Regulatory Act Explained’ (2013) 14 German LJ 1851. 
51
  Although, as proposed by Pech, this can be in part be explained by the traditionally formalistic interpretation 
of the rule of law by the Union and Court. Pech (n 14). 
52
  Aarhus Convention Compliance Committee, ‘Findings And Recommendations Of The Compliance 
Committee With Regard To Communication ACCC/C/2008/32’ (UN-ECE 2017). 
53
  See A Tancredi, ‘Enforcing WTO Law’ in A Jakab and D Kochenov (eds.), The Enforcement of EU Law and 
Values (OUP 2017). 
54
  See Joseph Weiler’s enlightening criticism of the seemingly somewhat smooth presentation of the latest case 
law: J.H.H. Weiler, ‘Epilogue: Judging Europe’s Judges – Apology and Critique’, in M. Adams et al. (eds.), 
Judging Europe’s Judges (Hart 2013) 235. See also Koen Lenaerts’ contribution in the same work, 
explaining the work of the Court. 
55
  Here we need to distinguish between the constraints related to the policing of the competences border – a 
federal animal – and the Rule of Law constraints within the EU’s sphere of competences. While the former 
might be said to be present – albeit weak – the latter is less pronounced still. On the ECJ’s self-censorship in 
policing the federal competences border, see e.g., N Nic Shuibhne, ‘EU Citizenship as Federal Citizenship’ 
in D Kochenov (ed), EU Citizenship and Federalism: The Role of Rights (CUP 2017); On the problematic 
outcomes of such modesty when not informed by any thought of going beyond the protection of the acquis, 
see D Kochenov, ‘Citizenship Without Respect’ (NYU School of Law 2010) 08/2010. 
56
  G Palombella, ‘Law’s Ideals and Law’s Global Connections. Some Concluding Notes’ (2014) Rivista di 
Filosofia del Diritto 123, 124. 
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of the European Union either by way of general principles, which the ECJ finds when it is in need of a 
remedy, or through explicit mention in the Treaties.
57
 General principles are a product wholly created 
by the Court.
58
 Already in 1969 did it find that the Community had incorporated fundamental human 
rights,
59
 even though the only reference to human rights was the non-discrimination clause on grounds 
of gender.
60
 Subsequently, the Court found fundamental rights to be a part of the general principles of 
Community law as they were “inspired” by the constitutional traditions of the Member States.61 The 
full extent of general principles in EU law is therefore always vague, and one would assume in a state 
of flux, as the constitutional traditions of the Member States may vary, just as the membership of the 
Union does.
62
 
The manner in which the Court finds these general principles is of interest, as it implies that there is a 
dialogue at work between legal orders. This is however not the case. Although the Court sees ECHR 
as a source of inspiration,
63
 perhaps even a constitutionalisation of these principles,
64
 it equally 
proceeds to find and distil them on its own merit. However, the Court has rarely studied the systems of 
law in the Member States to ascertain whether certain rights were common in all legal systems.
65
 It is 
therefore doubtful whether general principles are in effect part of a shared legal order, or stop-gap 
measures used by the Court to fill in certain lacunae.
66
 This is exemplified by the dialogue that 
constitutional courts have attempted to bring to the ECJ through preliminary references. Where they 
find a contestation between national constitutional values and the values of the European Union, they 
have virtually always – especially of late – found the Court to be insensitive to their requests. 
Although in earlier days the Court might have been willing to accommodate certain constitutional 
features,
67
 the following discussion on the nature of the judicial dialogue and its break down will 
illustrate how the reliance of the Court on the uniformity of the EU’s legal order has led to the de facto 
removal of the Member State’s constitutional values as a source of jurisdictio. If anything, in a 
reversal of the original place of the constitutions on the Member States, general principles now have 
the contrary effect, where constitutional pluralism is erased. The irony is apparently lost, as a Member 
State is precluded from deviation from the norm it is apparently itself a part. Furthermore, as has 
become clear from some of the earliest cases in which the Court of Justice has interacted with the 
                                                     
57
  See for instance Arts 67 and 82 TFEU on the operation of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. The 
political nature of the policy area has warranted an explicit mention of the “[…] traditions of the Member 
States.” 
58
  Case 8/55 Fédération Charbonnière de Belgique v High Authority EU:C:1956:11, [1956] ECR 291. 
59
  Case 26/69 Stauder EU:C:1969:57 [1969] ECR 419 para 7. 
60
  This non-discrimination provision was not a sign of an early enlightened European elite, but rather was an 
attempt to preclude social dumping by Member States who would utilise cheaper female labour.  
61
  Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft EU:C:1970:114 [1970] ECR 1125. para 4.  
62
  One would surmise that with the coming to pass of ‘Brexit’, there would be an effect on the constitutional 
traditions of the Member States and thus on the catalogue of principles such as they exist in the Union.  
63
  T Tridimas, The General Principles of EU Law (OUP 2006) 6. 
64
  As was already stated by the Joint Declaration on Human Rights in 1977; OJ 1977 C 103/1 Council 
Declaration on Democracy, EC Bulletin 3 1978, 5. 
65
  See for instance Case 44/79 Hauer, EU:C:1979:290 [1979] ECR I-3727 para 14ff.  
66
  Tridimas (n 63) s 1.6.1. 
67
  Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, para 40. 
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newest acceded members,
68
 there is a distinct possibility that the constitutional values that originally 
formed the jurisdictio is of a distinct homogeneous Western tradition.
69
 
EU law’s scrutiny from within: the Union’s values 
It is true that the EU has Article 2 TEU.
70
 However, since the time of the Copenhagen Criteria from 
which it largely originates,
71
 it has never been law in the sense of forming part of the body of the 
ordinary EU acquis.
72
 Consequently, given that the acquis on values largely does not exist, the EU is 
powerless to define their content. Consequently, the case law of the ECJ seems to be pointing towards 
Article 2 TEU not having acquired any self-standing value.
73
 Technical explanations for that are 
readily available: respect of the limited nature of EU’s powers. Such explanations no doubt are sold to 
a careless observer as emanations of adherence to the prevailing understanding of the Rule of Law. 
Yet, once scrutinised closely, they emerge as dubious: mutual trust based on the presumption of 
general adherence to the values where only the trust, but not the actual adherence is enforced is highly 
problematic.
74
 The EU turns its own rhetorical weakness into a tool for escaping the Rule of Law 
checks on its system of formal legality. 
From the perspective of approaching the Rule of Law as a balance in the duality of two types of law 
within the constitutional system – jurisdictio and gubernaculum, as opposed to conflating the meaning 
of the EU Rule of Law with legality – the EU emerges as a legal system that cannot boast the Rule of 
Law. The ‘Rule of Law’ in Article 2 TEU cannot thus have any meaning beyond a requirement to 
observe basic legal procedures and, possibly, a set of other well-known elements of legality.
75
 In a 
                                                     
68
  Illustrated for instance in Case C-399/09 Landtová EU:C:2011:415, which was later deemed to be an ultra 
vires act of the ECJ by the Czech Supreme Court. A discussion on the early case law of the constitutional 
courts of the ‘new’ Member States can be found in, D Kochenov, EU Enlargement and the Failure of 
Conditionality (Kluwer Law International 2008). 
69
  A case can be made that the Court has always had difficulties with approximating legal systems, as made 
clear by the upheaval caused by the Factortame cases, the first significant judicial collision between the 
continental system of the Community and the UK. P Craig, ‘Sovereignty of the United Kingdom Parliament 
after Factortame’ (1991) 11 YEL 221. 
70
  For an analysis embedding Art. 2 TEU in the context of other provisions of EU primary law, see C Hillion, 
‘Overseeing the Rule of Law in the EU’ in C Closa and D Kochenov (eds), Reinforcing Rule of Law 
Oversight in the European Union (CUP 2016). 
71
  For a legal-historical presentation, see, Kochenov, EU Enlargement and the Failure of Conditionality (n 68) 
chs 1 & 2. 
72
  The key reason for this, of course, is in the competence limitations imposed by Herren der Verträge on the 
Union; yet the cause does not change the result: Art. 2 TEU and its predecessors are no ordinary part of the 
EU’s gubernaculum. See, for a discussion, D Kochenov, ‘Declaratory Rule of Law: Self-Constitution 
through Unenforceable Promises’ in J Přibáň (ed), Self-Constitution of European Society (Routledge 2016). 
73
  Look, for instance, at the recent cases involving Hungary: the EU fights against the anti-constitutional 
movement in the Member State by attempting to tackle deep-rooted Art. 2 TEU problems using ordinary 
acquis elements, abundantly failing as a result. Never mind that it wins its cases: Hungary, having lost for 
petty acquis grounds, is nowhere nearer an improvement in its adherence to Art. 2 TEU values. Cf. KL 
Scheppele, ‘Enforcing the Basic Principles of EU Law through Systematic Infringement Actions’ in C Closa 
and D Kochenov (eds), Reinforcing Rule of Law Oversight in the European Union (Cambridge University 
Press 2016). 
74
  Indeed, as Halberstam has also rightly suggested, it is impossible to enforce the demand of trust when the 
substance of values is not enforced in any way in the Member States: D Halberstam, ‘It’s the Autonomy, 
Stupid: A Modest Defence of Opinion 2/13 on EU Accession to the ECHR, and the Way Forward’ (2015) 16 
German LJ 105. 
75
  Raz (n 18); R Fallon, ‘“The Rule of Law” as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse’ (1997) 97 Columbia LR 
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system with rhetorical adherence to legality through considerations of autonomy – which largely pre-
empts reality checks – and without the Rule of Law, generating injustice is not viewed as a problem,76 
and the legitimacy of the law as such thereby naturally remains undermined, while outstanding issues 
are interpreted away either as non-existent or falling to some other legal order – either national77 or 
ECtHR
78
 – to resolve. The ‘autonomous legal order’79 confidently emerges as a formally coherent 
system directly bound by nothing beyond the day-to-day rules of its own creation and operation. The 
Treaty text is its limit,
80
 with no greater aspiration in sight beyond being shielded from outside 
influence. Weiler’s take on its nature, which dates back to the nineties, is thus still profoundly correct 
today – it is a market standing alone without a mantle of ideals81 – all the recent values-inspired 
commotion notwithstanding. Checks on the substance of the law which aim to ensure that the law is 
limited by Law do not exist, thus impairing the Rule of Law as an institutional ideal. 
This, however, does not mean that the EU’s values are completely devoid of jurisdictio. The EU 
cannot boast of any jurisdictio besides perhaps the principles of the Internal Market. Indeed, if 
jurisdictio is taken to mean the DNA of the polity placed out of reach for the sovereign, then the EU 
has only one candidate to occupy this place: the internal market is what it is to promote and guarantee. 
However, how much of a Rule of Law are we talking about – in the modern constitutional sense – if 
the internal market rules are granted the role of a jurisdictio in an autopoetic system, which is also a 
self-proclaimed constitutional order? The engagement of EU law, the dispensation of its protections 
and the rights it grants, are usually connected to internal market thinking. The internal market as the 
founding value is protected with true ferocity. The EU has been very effective in mobilising the 
discourse of knowledge and expertise,
82
 or of bright unchallengeable goals,
83
 to discredit claims of 
political (and also legal) contestation of its law
84
 – the emergence of jurisdictio from within is as 
difficult as sourcing it from the (blocked) external scrutiny.  
Even if we assume for a moment that a constitutional system can evolve around the internal market 
serving as a crucial element of its essential Rule of Law core,
85
 the question remains open whether the 
internal market has actually ever played such a role in the EU. The answer, most likely, will be ‘no’. 
Not because it would obviously be an affront (given the generally accepted sets of values in any 
European society) to measure rights and protections against the ultimate rationale of the market, and 
cross-border trade (what the EU has been not infrequently accused on doing
86
), but because the 
internal market rules are by definition an insufficient set to measure dignity, rights and equality 
                                                     
76
  A Williams and D Kochenov, ‘Europe’s Justice Deficit Introduced’ in D Kochenov, G de Búrca and A 
Williams (eds), Europe’s Justice Deficit? (Hart 2015) 1 and, in the same volume, S Douglas-Scott, ‘Justice, 
Injustice and the Rule of Law in the EU’, 51. 
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  E.g. C-135/08 Rottmann EU:C:2010:104 [2010] ECR I-1449. 
78
  E.g. C-434/09 McCarthy EU:C:2011:277 [2011] ECR I-3375; C-256/11 Dereci EU:C:2011:734 [2011] ECR 
I-11315. 
79
  Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL EU:C:1964:66 [1964] ECR 585 (special English edition). 
80
  AT Williams, ‘Taking Values Seriously: Towards a Philosophy of EU Law’ (2009) 29 OJLS 549. 
81
  JHH Weiler, ‘Bread and Circus: The State of the European Union’ (1998) 4 CJEL 223, at 231. 
82
  M Bartl, ‘The Way We Do Europe: Subsidiarity and the Substantive Democratic Deficit’ (2015) 21 ELJ 23; 
On the instrumental deployment of the justice discourse in the EU to justify any outcome, see, S Roy, 
‘Justice as Europe’s Signifier’ in D Kochenov, G de Búrca and A Williams (eds), Europe’s Justice Deficit? 
(Hart 2015). 
83
  Davies, (n 10) 
84
  AJ Menéndez, ‘Whose Justice? Which Europe?’ in D Kochenov, G de Búrca and A Williams (eds.) Europe’s 
Justice Deficit? (Hart 2015) 137. 
85
  For very well-reasoned doubts about this, see, N Nic Shuibhne, The Resilience of EU Market Citizenship 
(2010) 47 CMLRev. 1597. 
86
  E.g. A Williams, EU Human Rights Policies: A Study in Irony (OUP 2004). 
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against, as the ultimate rationale, in the hard cases. They are what they are: part of the gubernaculum, 
playing a role in guaranteeing EU legality, but falling short at the same time of establishing a viable 
jurisdictio–gubernaculum border. 
The role of the national courts in the shaping of the Union’s Rule of Law 
The autopoetic reality of EU law is only infused with Rule of Law understood as a tension between the 
two types of law through the possibility of the national courts’ resistance to the ECJ’s reading of the 
rule of law as a requirement of unchecked supranational rule. As mentioned above, the legislatures 
cannot play any similar role in the EU legal system due to the nature of the division of powers 
between the EU and the Member States and the prominent role played by negative integration. It is 
thus necessary to look at the relationship between the national courts and the ECJ in some more detail 
to assess the state of the Rule of Law in Europe: a diagnosis affecting, importantly, both the EU and 
the national levels of the law. This judicial dialogue is not unlike a worn Roman coin, with on the 
obverse a beautiful portrait of the maiden Europa, the official story from every textbook; on the 
reverse, the vacant actual value. The dialogue story is as much a story of breakdown as it is a story of 
the actual policing of the jurisdictio-gubernaculum divide. 
The obverse 
Whether perceived from the role of a Supreme Court, whose judgment affect all belying courts,
87
 or as 
an equal partner amongst the other apex courts of Europe engaging in dialogue with peers,
88
 the 
element that ties this relationship together is the role of national judges as Union judges. The working 
relationship has been defined by the Court as national courts and ECJ working together whilst “[...] 
both keeping within their respective jurisdiction, with the aim of ensuring that Community law is 
applied in a unified manner to make direct and complementary contributions to the working out of a 
decision.”.89  
Lower courts in national legal order are said in the textbook to be co-opted in making use of the 
judicial dialogue, as it empowers them vis-a-vis their hierarchical superior brethren, as the standard 
story goes.
90
 Given the status of ECJ ruling even on preliminary references, this endows these lower 
courts with power on par with that of their apex courts.
91
 The flip-side of this relationship is that the 
Court is almost totally dependent on the references. Although the ECJ has often been described as 
activist or centralist in nature,
92
 the only possibility it has to act is through the large discretion offered 
to lower national courts. Indeed, this dependency is increased by the fact that there is almost no direct 
relationship between individual applicants and the Court, and the fact that the reference procedure is 
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  Case 16/65 Schwarze EU:C:1965:117 [1965] ECR I-1081 p. 886 
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European legal order has been of interest to many commentators, see for instance: CO Lenz, ‘The Role and 
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not a remedy which those applicants can invoke before national courts.
93
 The addition of the Köbler 
case law can therefore only be seen as a logical way through which the Court tries to reinforce this 
relationship, as any disturbances in the working of the inter-court dialogue can have a diffusing effect 
on the coherence of Union law. By treating courts as an emanation of the unitary state, and having 
them therefore fall under the Francovich non-contractual liability regime,
94
 the Court is assuring itself 
of consistency of the acquis, without lacunae.
95
 
The Court thus not only fosters, but depends on the inter-court dialogue for the formation and 
maintenance of the European legal order. Until recently it could not afford to sour the relationship that 
it has built up in 50 years of references, as the dialogue is not only the most significant way in which 
the Court can give effect to European law, and enforce the rights derived thereof. When the system 
works, the functioning of the Rule of Law is secured, as European norms are fitted into the legal 
orders of the Member States with respect for the constitutional traditions and arrangements in those 
states. This is perhaps most famously emphasized in the Solange I & II interaction between the 
German Verwaltungsgericht and the Court, as accorded by the BVerfG. In these cases, a possible clash 
occurred between the concept of fundamental rights as protected by the German constitutional order, 
and that of the European legal order. The German Administrative court referred a case to the ECJ, on 
whether it was possible to have European law set aside by more stringent protections in the German 
constitutional order. The Court answered that a measure of the Union cannot be affected by national 
law, as that would “[…] have an adverse effect on the uniformity and efficacy of [EU] law.”96 
However, the Court reached out, stating in the following paragraph that “[…] examination should be 
made as to whether or not any analogous guarantee inherent in Community law has been 
disregarded.”97 As the referring court saw itself faced with an answer that produced similar problems 
to the questions it had posed, it referred its case to the BVerfG, requesting a ruling on the compatibility 
of EU rights protection with the bar set by the German constitutional order. Due to the ECJ’s opening 
on the protection of fundamental rights in the Union, the BVerfG could balance the interest of the 
German constitutional order with that of ‘supremacy’.98 This is inter-court dialogue protecting the 
Rule of Law; the Court of Justice opens up to the jurisdictio of fundamental rights that are influenced 
by the German norms. There is a mutual control that elevates the general standard. Yet this balance is 
precarious and this dialogue is easily shifted into a monologue.
99
 Recent developments illustrate how 
the Court’s slavish entrapment between the Scylla and Charybdis of supremacy and autonomy has 
caused a rift in the dialogue that may well threaten the Rule of Law in the EU. 
The reverse 
The current system of judicial dialogue is therefore only one in name, used through the decades to 
appease the constitutional courts of the Member States. Supremacy, the Court’s reliance on legality as 
the implementation of the Rule of Law and the approach to the acquis as Biblical Truth has created a 
system whereby only the Court, is in fact the law. This can be seen as the result of options of a role as 
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hierarchy. J Komárek, ‘Federal Elements in the Community Judicial System’ (2005) 42 CMLRev 9. 
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  Id. 
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  37 BVerfGE 271. 
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either a Supreme Court or an equal partner, which we mentioned above.
100
 As the Court positioned 
itself as the ultimate arbiter of EU law, and made use of the preliminary reference procedure as a 
carrot for national courts to refer cases, so too has it made use of a stick. It can in fact be argued, that 
every time the Court has given the national courts a carrot, for instance in the form of more autonomy, 
it has followed this up by a quick use of a stick to set the limits. Sarmiento gives the example of the 
interaction between the Court’s approach in CILFIT,101 granting national apex courts the jurisdiction, 
under specific conditions, to ascertain when a reference is not needed, followed up by Foto-Frost,
102
 
which denies them the jurisdiction to rule on the validity of EU law itself.
103
 As the corpus of EU law 
expanded, the use of the carrot became less and less necessary, however the Court sees an increasing 
necessity for the use of the stick. Through the interpretation of autonomy and supremacy the Court 
secures the unassailable security of the position of the EU’s legal order and with that, itself. This is 
perfectly exemplified in those cases in which the ECJ is asked to review the Treaty on the basis of the 
Rule of Law. In the case law regarding Article 263 TFEU, we are explicitly confronted by the circular 
reasoning. The core reasoning is this: the Union acts in accordance with the Rule of Law, as the Treaty 
states that the Union acts in accordance with the Rule of Law.
104
 The slavish dedication to form over 
substance, can be best observed in two developments. First, the most direct result of the problematic 
evolution of values in the EU’s constitutional order is the strain placed on the dialogue between a 
number of constitutional courts and the Court of Justice. Second, we can observe the Court’s own 
valuation of formalistic values over the Rule of Law in its reasoning in Opinion 2/13.
105
 
The deepening of European integration without any real perspective on the fundamental rights or, 
dedication to the Rule of Law, ensured in Member State legal orders, or a substantive implementation 
thereof by the Union itself has produced now famous cases such as Melloni and Gauweiler. Melloni is 
the continuation of the saga of the problematic Arrest Warrant (EAW) legislation. The EAW proved 
incompatible with the manner in which the Spanish Constitutional Court had interpreted the right to a 
fair trial. As is expected, the ECJ did not offer any room for discussion on the extent to which Spain 
could apply more stringent protections. Of greater interest is the manner in which the Spanish Court 
subsequently applied the ECJ’s answer. Through interpretation on its Declaration 1/2004, which 
analysed the constitutionality of the Constitution for Europe, the Spanish Constitutional Court came to 
the conclusion that the Treaty respected the rights and limitations laid down in the Spanish 
constitution. Yet it reaffirmed that the primacy of EU law did not violate the supremacy of the 
constitution. Going further, the Spanish Constitutional Court gave the caveat that if Union law were to 
deviate and go against these values, the Constitutional Court would protect the sovereignty of the 
Spanish people and the supremacy of the constitution.
106
 
That reassertion of the supremacy of the national constitution does not stand on itself. The Gauweiler 
case will not only be remembered for the fact that it has been the first case in which the BVergG made 
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its first reference, but the manner in which it did will be long discussed.
107
 The BVerfG has the task to 
defend the constitutional identity of the German Federal Republic. In that capacity, it did not as such 
pose a question on the democratic safeguards in place regarding the ECB and the programme of 
Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT), it set out a position on which it wished the ECJ to agree. 
Unless the OMT decision was interpreted in the light of the BVerfG’s criteria, it stated that it would 
clearly be ultra vires.
108
 Although the ECJ secured the position of the ECB in its judgment, its 
application by the BVerfG is a clear expression of the German constitutional protector’s dislike of the 
manner in which it has been treated.
109
 The ‘crisis’ might be averted, yet the conflict remains.110 
The ECJ does not demonstrate a wish to adhere to the values set out by Article 2 TEU. The Rule of 
Law in these situations of dialogue has clearly been derogated in favour of the gods of supremacy, 
autonomy and consistency – not the Rule of Law. Yet it has to be asked, whether the European legal 
order would truly have suffered if the ECJ had earnestly addressed the fears of the BVerfG over the 
democratic guarantees underpinning the OMT’s by the ECB, a notoriously problematic institution to 
oversee.
111
 Similarly, given the nature of the EAW due to the manner in which it has been adopted 
through the third pillar on Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters, where the powers of 
both parliament and the Court are limited, would the scrutiny requested by the constitutional courts in 
the numerous cases on this act have had a detrimental effect on the effectuation of the Law? Even the 
most ardent fan of Luxembourg must see that the Rule of Law is now being offered on an altar 
constructed purely out of self-justification. 
There are now numerous examples: the Italian constitutional court that requests the ECJ to revisit the 
judgment in Taricco as it would lead to a breach of legal certainty in Italy;
112
 the Danish supreme court 
has ruled that it does not see itself bound by ‘general principles’ following Kücükdeveci,113 after the 
ECJ had rejected the reasoning the Danish court offered in its reference;
114
 to a lesser extent, the 
forced mutual recognition of the EAW has also caused problems for the French constitutional 
council.
115
 These cases may seem to the uninitiated a response by constitutional courts to growing 
euroscepticism, but in fact they are the culmination of a process that has been taking place behind the 
curtains for a while. It has been merely the fact that the main actors have been the German 
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constitutional court, which has been known to be at least critical of letting go of the supremacy of its 
constitutional regime;
116
 and the courts of relatively new additions to the Union in Poland and the 
Czech republic, that the breakdown of the dialogue has been able to be played down. In all of these 
cases there is the clear stand-off between constitutional courts and their role as custodians over their 
values and principles, and the ECJ which through the twin dogmas of supremacy and effectiveness 
does not allow for any deviation or, which is more problematic, substantive discussion. There is no 
longer a dialogue between equals, in effect the ECJ sees itself now as the hegemon in a single legal 
order. Sovereigns do not enter into conversations, they hold audiences. 
Conclusion 
Dialogical Rule of Law implying the tension between jurisdictio and gubernaculum enforced via an 
array of different means and dialogical in nature is very effective in discussing the state of the Rule of 
Law in any given legal order. It allows for analysing the adherence to that essentially contested 
concept, regardless of the precise list of terms that fall within it. The EU is a problematic example of a 
legal system where the Rule of Law defined in such a way is under constant attack. Even though there 
are clear sources from which it could derive jurisdictio, international law, the constitutional values of 
its members and its own constitutional principles, the Union places primacy in the value of its 
gubernaculum – the acquis, in combination with three deeply anti-dialogical principles: supremacy, 
autonomy, and direct effect, which threaten the substance of the core values and principles guiding the 
law in any liberal democracy.  
That the dialogical Rule of Law is in peril, we have shown, is due to the ECJ’s imposition of the strict 
adherence not to the rule of law, but to these principles of EU law that it itself has created in order to 
pre-empt any substantive value-based arguments able to challenge the autopoetic orthodoxy the ECJ is 
busy enforcing. This is especially problematic as it requires constitutional courts who see it as their 
task to protect inherent constitutional values and rights to set aside these values in favour of vague 
euro-speak such as coherence and supremacy. However, if the ECJ would allow for actual dialogue 
instead of the current Ciauşeschian monologue, the conditions for the Rule of Law in the EU to 
flourish could be created, turning the EU into a much richer constitutional system. Not only would it 
create a greater willingness for constitutional courts to engage with the ECJ, if the ECJ were to allow 
for the slight constitutional pluralism that would result from that dialogue there would be a greater 
oversight fostered by a greater support. The balance and tension between jurisdictio and 
gubernaculum would be restored. 
This active choice on the part of the ECJ leads to the conclusion that without any change, there lie 
only two possible scenarios at the end of this road. Either the constitutional courts, and later lower 
courts, will start to ignore the edicts of the Court in Luxembourg in the name of the fundamental and 
indispensable constitutional essentials of their legal systems they are obliged to protect, or there is a 
slow but steady decline of the rule of law as the failure to enforce it and the other values of the Union 
lead to an increase in the political stale-mates such as they are currently occurring in Poland and 
Hungary. It therefore has to be concluded that the only option open the ECJ and the EU itself, is a 
reinvigorating of the judicial dialogue as the to this day only successful form of dialogical Rule of 
Law deployable in the Union. 
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